Antitrust by Boscoe, Mark H.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 58 
Issue 2 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 6 
February 2021 
Antitrust 
Mark H. Boscoe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Mark H. Boscoe, Antitrust, 58 Denv. L.J. 249 (1981). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
ANTITRUST
OVERVIEW
During the past year, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has consid-
ered several antitrust issues involving matters at the forefront of antitrust
law. Questions such as state action antitrust immunity, the insurance indus-
try's exemption from the antitrust laws, contribution among antitrust viola-
tors, and the Sherman Act's jurisdictional reach were all considered by the
appellate court during the period of this survey. These issues will be dis-
cussed in the context of the decisions that purported to resolve them. In
addition, two decisions of lesser importance will be briefly digested.
I. THE SHERMAN ACT VERSUS FEDERALISM: A CLASH BETWEEN
GIArrS
A. Introduction
The Sherman Act has been called the "Magna Carta of free enter-
prise,"' yet the scope of this central charter of our national economic policy
was not defined by Congress when it adopted the Act. The contours of the
antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, have been de-
lineated, instead, by the judiciary. On occasion, the antitrust statutes have
brushed up against the tenet of federalism. Whether the action of states and
their subdivisions come within the purview of the antitrust laws, when gov-
ernmental acts have an anticompetitive impact, is a question the Supreme
Court rarely addressed prior to the 1970's. Although recent decisions of the
Court have dealt unsatisfactorily with shaping the contours of state immu-
nity from the antitrust laws, the Court has clearly drawn an immunity tem-
plate by which to judge state activity. It is the duty of the federal courts to
follow Supreme Court pronouncements. In Community Commur'cations Co. v.
City of Boulder,2 the Tenth Circuit court was faced with the competing con-
cerns of our national economic policy, on the one hand, and the pressing
needs of a municipality to freely carry out its governmental functions, on the
other. The Tenth Circuit court rendered a decision in conflict with the
Supreme Court's most recent dictates on state immunity from the antitrust
laws. The court of appeals may have heard the siren call of the tenth
amendment.3 The Tenth Circuit judges also had to confront critical
problems which the Supreme Court has left in the wake of its attempt to
define state immunity.
This section of the antitrust survey will attempt to analyze the Tenth
Circuit's decision in light of the Supreme Court's recent state antitrust im-
1. United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). The Sherman Act, one
of the major pieces of antitrust legislation, is found at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
2. 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980).
3. The tenth amendment proclaims that "the powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states respectively, or
to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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munity decisions. An effort will also be made to briefly explain the problems
inherent in the present state immunity doctrine and the pressing need for its
change, a need which may have been the driving force behind the decision
in Community Communications Co.
B. The Birth of a Doctrine: "State Action" Immunity
The first antitrust law was passed by Congress in 1890 in response to a
growing awareness of the harmful economic consequences apparent in the
concentration of economic power in the hands of the few and the mighty.
4
The legislative history of the Act is devoid of any congressional concern with
anticompetitive acts of government. 5 A federal court was first faced with the
task of determining the scope of the Sherman Act in Lowenstein V. Evans.
6
The court held that the state could not be attacked for its monopolistic activ-
ities since the state was neither a person nor a corporation amenable to suit.
7
The Supreme Court's decision in Olsen v. Smith8 gave lower courts the first
guidelines on state immunity from the federal antitrust law. The Olsen
Court refused to allow harbor pilots, unlicensed by the state, to attack the
state's licensing statute as a restraint on trade. The Court found that Con-
gress had evinced an express desire to allow state regulation of this activity,
and that the state's immunity from the antitrust laws would adhere, unless
Congress expressed a clear statement to the contrary. 9 In the same year that
Olsen was decided, it became equally clear that state antitrust immunity is
not a transferable gift which a state may bestow on private parties. In North-
ern Securities Co. v. United Slates,'0 the Court refused to immunize the activities
of two railroads, merging in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, sim-
ply because the railroad's actions were legal under state law. A state cannot
impart immunity to private parties by declaring their anticompetitive ac-
tions legal.
After the Northern Securities decision, no major advance in the state ac-
tion immunity doctrine occurred for almost forty years. I The United States
4. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (current version codified at
49 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)), created a commission to prevent rate discrimination by railroads. The
next year saw anti-monopoly planks in the platforms of both major political parties. A. NEALE,
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 12 (2d ed. 1970). The Fifty-first Congress, in authorizing
the Sherman Act, declared itself to be protecting the public interest by attacking "these great
trusts, these great corporations, these large moneyed institutions." 21 CONG. R.c. 2562 (1898).
5. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
6. 69 F. 908 (D.S.C. 1895).
7. Id. at 911. In Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390
(1906), Justice Holmes declared that a city may sue under the Sherman Act. He interpreted the
term "person" in section 8, the general definitions paragraph of the Act, to include municipali-
ties; thus, under section 7 of the Sherman Act (replaced by section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1976)), the city was deemed to be a person injured in its "business or property" and
capable of collecting treble damages.
8. 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
9. Id at 344-45.
10. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
11. See note 7 supra. In Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), the Court extended Chatta-
nooga Foundry & Pipeworks v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), to its logical end. The
Court held that a state, like a city, was a "person" under section 7 of the Sherman Act and
could, therefore, bring an antitrust action against private parties.
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Supreme Court did not again address the immunity of states as defendants
in an antitrust action until the seminal decision of Parker V. Brown.' 2 Accord-
ing to the California statute challenged by the plaintiff in Parker, a state
advisory commission was authorized to supervise a program restricting com-
petition among farmers in order to maintain stable prices along the distribu-
tive chain. The plaintiff, a packer and producer of raisins, sought an
injunction ' 3 against the state officials involved in the program, claiming that
the state agricultural act was in violation of the Sherman Act. Chief Justice
Stone, scrutinizing the legislative history and the language of the Sherman
Act, found nothing to suggest
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of govern-
ment in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign,
save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their au-
thority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.
14
The lack of reference to state anticompetitive behavior in the legislative his-
tory 15 convinced the Court of the impropriety of expanding the scope of the
antitrust laws to encompass state action. The Court found the alleged an-
ticompetitive acts to be no more than the legitimate enactment and enforce-
ment of state legislation. Furthermore, an examination of the federal statute
concerning agricultural proration 16 reinforced the Court's view of the anti-
trust immunity issue. Because the federal act also restricted competition in
the marketing of agricultural products, there was no conflict with the state's
proration program. 7
After the Parker decision another long hiatus set in before the Court had
occasion to consider again the scope of state immunity from the antitrust
12. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The immunity doctrine born of this decision occasionally will be
referred to in this comment as "Parker immunity."
13. The injunction was sought pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
14. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
15. In Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 420-21 (1978), Chief Jus-
tice Burger noted that Congress' silence on the anticompetitive actions of states is not necessarily
dispositive of the state immunity issue. In the years immediately surrounding the Sherman
Act's passage, the Court had strictly construed the jurisdictional requirement of interstate com-
merce. Manufacturing, as an isolated activity, was deemed not to constitute interstate com-
merce and Congress was precluded from regulating it. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
States were said to have broad powers to regulate business activities within their borders.
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). Because of the Court's narrow posture on
the jurisdictional reach of the interstate commerce clause, it may have appeared improbable to
Congress that the Court would permit suits against the states and their subdivisions for viola-
tions of the Sherman Act. Several commentators have also made this criticism. See, e.g., Slater,
Antitrwst and Government Actn. A Formulafor Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71, 83
(1974).
16. Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 601 (1976).
17. 317 U.S. at 354. The Court determined that Congress, in enacting the federal agricul-
tural marketing act, contemplated state programs similar to California's restrictions. Both acts
were consistent in that they sought to achieve a parity price, the federal statute expressly and
the state program by its effect. Evidence of this consistency of purpose was displayed by a loan
agreement between California and the federal Commodity Credit Corporation, which loan was
approved by the Department of Agriculture. Id. at 356.
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laws. '8 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar'9 provided that opportunity. The Court
struck down the state and local bar associations' minimum fee schedules as
price fixing violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The state bar's de-
fense, that its activities were immune from suit as state action, was not per-
suasive. The Goldfarb Court read Parker as requiring a showing that the state,
acting as sovereign, had compelled the challenged activities. 20 The defend-
ants, however, could point to no Virginia statute, state court decision, or
state supreme court rule that required the minimum fee schedule. The sta-
tus of the Virginia bar as an appendage of the state 2' did not, of its own
force, cloak the bar with immunity from the Sherman Act.
The Court's next reflection on state action antitrust immunity focused
not on a state-related entity, as in Goldfarb, but concentrated instead on pri-
vate parties involved in a state program. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,22
Justice Stevens wrote the majority decision, joined, however, by only four
other members of the Court in parts I and 111.23 The private utility, Detroit
Edison, which allegedly had unlawfully restrained competition in its sale of
electric light bulbs,24 was held not to be immune from the federal antitrust
laws, even though the state regulatory commission had approved of the chal-
lenged actions of the utility, and even though the defendant could not dis-
continue those actions without the state commission's consent. The Court
found the following facts to be determinative: the state had expressed no
opinion as to the propriety of a utility-sponsored light-bulb program; the
responsibility for initiating the light-bulb program belonged to the utility;
the market for light bulbs was not a regulated area of the economy; and the
light-bulb program was not necessary to the state's regulation of its electric
utilities. 25 While the Cantor decision does little to clarify the Court's state
18. The Court's decision in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384
(1951), concerned an issue related to, but distinct from, state antitrust immunity. The Court
weighed the validity of a state's economic regulations under the doctrine of preemption. In
Schwegmann, the Court found Louisiana's Fair Trade Law, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 391-396
(West 1965) (repealed by 1977 La. Acts No. 709 § 1), to be inconsistent with the Miller-Tydings
Amendment to section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (amended by Consumer
Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801) (repealing Miller-Tydings
Amendment). Other decisions peripherally implicating the state action immunity doctrine,
before Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975),\were: Eastern R.R. Presidents'
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); and Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
19. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
20. Id. at 790.
21. The Virginia Bar Association was granted the authority to issue decisions in matters of
legal ethics. Id. at 791.
22. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
23. Chief Justice Burger concurred separately because he disagreed with what he inter-
preted as Justice Stevens' narrow view of Parker immunity. He emphasized that state action
immunity may extend beyond state officials because the" 'threshold inquiry.., is whether the
acivity is required by the state acting as sovereign.' " 428 U.S. at 604 (quoting Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975)) (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun concurred
only in the judgment. 428 U.S. at 605-15.
24. The plaintiff, a retail druggist who sold light bulbs, alleged that Detroit Edison's prac-
tice of providing free light bulbs to its customers was a tying arrangement. Plaintiff asserted
that the utility took advantage of its monopoly in the distribution of electricity to unreasonably
restrain competition in the retail light bulb market. S-t section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 14 (1976).
25. 428 U.S. at 600.
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action test, it may point to the emphasis on state compulsion in the antitrust
immunity doctrine. Detroit Edison, regardless of its status as a public utility,
failed to receive immunity because the state had not compelled its chal-
lenged actions.
The importance of state compulsion was reemphasized in Bates o. State
Bar of Arizona.26 Primarily a decision grounded on first amendment con-
cerns, Bates also included an antitrust challenge to the Arizona Supreme
Court's disciplinary rule restricting advertising by attorneys. Justice Black-
mun, in an opinion distinguishing Coldfarb and Cantor from Bates, held that
the Arizona Bar was immune from the antitrust laws. The most cogent fac-
tors in the Bates analysis were the state supreme court's promulgation and
enforcement of the advertising restriction, the important state interest in reg-
ulating attorneys, and the Court's acknowledgment that the state, through
its supreme court, was the real defendant.
On the eve of one of the most far-reaching decisions in state action juris-
prudence, the two most relevant criteria for obtaining Parker immunity were
that the challenged restraint was "compelled by direction of the State acting
as a sovereign, ' 27 and that the party seeking immunity was the state or an
agency 28 of the state. Only the latter of these considerations was present in
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 29 The Lafayette Court consid-
ered the quantum of state involvement in the activities of political subdivi-
sions necessary to qualify them for immunity from the antitrust laws.
The immunity issue arose out of an antitrust counterclaim by a private
utility, Louisiana Power and Light Co., against two cities that owned and
operated competing electric utilities.30 The majority decision is reminiscent
of Cantor, in that only five members of the Court concurred in a segment of
this opinion. 31 The majority held that Parker immunity is not automatically
granted to a city simply because of its status as a subdivision of the state.
32
The holding was more complicated however, because, while Chief Justice
Burger acknowledged that municipal status, by itself, was not sufficient to
26. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
27. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 791.
28. "Agency" in this context is used in a generic sense, to indicate that the entity was
created by the state and had no independent significance outside of that relationship.
29. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
30. The cities, Lafayette and Plaquemine, Louisiana, originally brought suit against Loui-
siana Power & Light Co. for, tnter alia, refusing to wheel power and for boycotting the cities, in
order to retain sole control over electric bulk power in the area, in violation of sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act. "Wheeling of power" means that a utility allows its transmission lines to
be used by another. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). The
private utility counterclaimed, alleging that the two cities had violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act by, inter alia, using long term supply agreements to exclude
competition and requiring customers of Louisiana Power & Light to purchase electricity from
the cities if they desired continued water and gas service. 435 U.S. at 392 nn.4-6.
31. Chief Justice Burger again concurred separately, this time only in Part I of Justice
Brennan's opinion and in the judgment. 435 U.S. at 418-26.
32. Justice Brennan was concerned that "tilf municipalities were free to make economic
choices counseled solely by their own parochial interests and without regard to their anticompe-
titive effects, a serious chink in the armor of antitrust protection would be introduced at odds
with the comprehensive national policy Congress established." 435 U.S. at 408. The Court
remanded this case to the district court to determine, according to the Court's state action
immunity test, if the city-run public utilities were immune from the antitrust counterclaim.
1981]
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confer antitrust immunity,33 the thrust of his concurrence focused on the
commercial nature of the cities' actions. 34 The Lafayette plurality set out a
test for determining Parker immunity: The test requires a showing that the
challenged activity was "engaged in as an act of government by the State as
sovereign, or, by its subdivisions pursuant to state policy to displace competi-
tion with regulation or monopoly public service."'35 This test, by using the
phrase "pursuant to state policy," appears to incorporate the state "compul-
sion" test of Goldfarb, as the Chief Justice noted. 36 In his concurrence, Chief
Justice Burger suggested that he would require more than state compulsion
of the challenged restraint; immunity should not adhere unless its absence
would foil the state's regulatory scheme. 37 No clear test of state action anti-
trust immunity emerged from the Lafayette decision because of the differing
views expressed in the plurality opinion and in the Burger concurrence. No
similar ambiguity, however, is found in the Court's most recent antitrust
immunity decision.
In the Court's unanimous opinion in California Retail Liquor Dealers Asso-
ctation v. Midca/ Aluminum, Inc. ,38 California's wine pricing system was found
to enjoy no immunity from the Sherman Act. 39 Justice Powell explained the
Court's understanding of Parker immunity. The test for state action antitrust
immunity came from the opinion in Bates, reconfirmed by the plurality in
Lafayette: "First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated
33. "There is nothing in Parker v. Brown, or its progeny, which suggests that a proprietary
enterprise with the inherent capacity for economically disruptive anticompetitive effects should
be exempt from the Sherman Act merely because it is organized under state law as a municipal-
ity." 435 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted).
34. "There is nothing in this record to support any assumption other than that this is an
ordinary dispute among competitors in the same market." Id. at 419.
35. Id. at 413.
36. Id. at 425 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
37. Id. at 426. Chief Justice Burger's reliance on the municipalities running their own
utilities, as opposed to merely regulating private utilities, has led one commentator to interpret
the Chief Justice's concurrence as favoring a blanket immunity for state subdivisions whose
anticompetitive activities could be categorized as "governmental". See The Supreme Court, 1977
Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1, 281 (1978).
38. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). Justice Brennan did not participate in the decision of this case.
However, since Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion in Lafayette, it is hardly likely that
he would have dissented in Mdcal.
39. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., a wholesale distributor of wine in California, sought an in-
junction in the state court of appeals to prevent enforcement of California's wine price-fixing
program. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d. 979, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1979).
Under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24866 (West 1964), vineyards and wine wholesalers were
required to set prices through a fair trade contract or post a price list governing the price retail-
ers and consumers had to pay for wine. Anyone in the distributive chain selling below the set
price was subject to state sanction. Id. § 24880. Midcal sought the injunction after it was
charged with violating the state program by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.
The state court of appeals found the wine pricing program to be violative of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The appellate court held that the state department which enforced the wine
scheme lacked immunity. Additionally, the state's defense that section 2 of the twenty-first
amendment protected the state program was dismissed. Cf Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control
Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 579 P.2d 476, 146 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1978) (distilled liquor fair trade
law did not confer antitrust immunity). The California Supreme Court declined to hear Mideat
and the state agency decided against seeking a writ of certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court. The California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, a trade association of in-




and affirmatively expressed as state policy;' second, the policy must be 'ac-
tively supervised' by the state itself."4° While the California wine pricing
scheme met the state policy criterion, it failed at the second hurdle. The
Court saw no evidence of active state supervision. The statutory scheme did
not include state review of price schedules or fair trade contracts, nor was it
mandated that such schedules and contract terms be set by California. The
state merely enforced private agreements.
C. The Facts in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder
41
In Community Communications, the Tenth Circuit court was faced with an
appeal by the defendants from the district court's order4 2 of a preliminary
injunction against the city. Community Communications Company (CCC)
holds a non-exclusive franchise from the City of Boulder to operate a cable
television company within Boulder's city limits. 43 There are, at the present
time, no other cable franchisees. The permit or franchise issued by the city is
actually no more than a contract, enacted in the form of an ordinance. The
city council, alleging a reconsideration of its cable television goals, passed an
ordinance on December 19, 1979,4 4 imposing a ninety-day moratorium on
CCC's cable expansion in Boulder. Concurrently, the city revoked and reen-
acted CCC's franchise to include the moratorium. 45 The city, preparing to
seek other applicants for its cable television market, drafted a model ordi-
nance and sought comment from the cable industry. The ordinance was to
be negotiated and enacted in lieu of a contract. 46 Subsequent to Boulder's
actions, CCC brought suit against the city and against those parties involved
in a recently organized cable television corporation, 47 alleging that the en-
actment of the two new ordinances violated, inter aha, section 1 of the Sher-
40. 435 U.S. at 410 (citing 430 U.S. at 362).
41. 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980).
42. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo.
1980).
43. CCC, together with its predecessor, has operated in Boulder since 1964. The city's
twenty-year contract with the cable television firm is in the form of an ordinance. Under this
ordinance, CCC can string cable over the entire city either for a cable television system or for a
community antenna system (CATV). CCC's system is involved in retransmission, not program
origination. Since February 1980, CCC has utilized its newly developed satellite capability. Its
program content has expanded greatly from its former schedule, which comprised only Denver
and Cheyenne television stations. Cable is strung via utility poles, most of which are jointly
owned by the Colorado Public Service Company and Mountain Bell Telephone Company.
CCC has obtained a license from the utilities to use their poles. Id at 1036.
44. Boulder, Colo. Ordinance 4473 (Dec. 19, 1979).
45. Boulder, Colo. Ordinance 4472 (Dec. 19, 1979).
46. Some of the more interesting features of the model ordinance include:
the city's right to purchase the cable company, at a price excluding good-will and
limited to depreciated investment; the city's right of prior approval of every company
contract; rate regulation; the city's right to change rates at any time; a 5% franchise fee
(two and one-half times the present fee); a requirement for five leased access channels;
a complaint procedure monitored by the city manager, with a liquidated damage pro-
vision; a requirement to continually upgrade company facilities to state-of-the-art con-
ditions; and a requirement for renegotiation, at specified intervals, of rate structures,
free or discounted service, services provided, programming offered, and human rights.
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d at 710 (10th Cir. 1980) (Markey,
J., dissenting).
47. The other defendants were Boulder Communications Co. (BCC), a partnership, and




At the preliminary hearing on the requested injunction, the city de-
fended its conduct on the basis of Parker immunity. Boulder asserted that its
status as a home rule city, as provided by Colorado's Constitution, 49 made
its action in regulating cable television tantamount to action of the state.
50
The district court held that the city lacked immunity from the Sherman Act,
and found that CCC could suffer "irrevocable injury" without the requested
injunction. The lower court found the city's method of regulating CCC to
be dispositive. In light of the Lafayette and Midcal decisions, the court de-
cided that the city's use of "an offer and acceptance mechanism" was not
"characteristic of utility regulation," and therefore, was not a form of gov-
ernment regulation deserving of antitrust immunity.5 1 The district court
was unimpressed with Boulder's home rule argument. The court found that
the regulation of cable television touched upon matters beyond local con-
cern, justifying federal intervention through the application of the Sherman
Act. No discovered case law characterized cable television as a matter of
local concern.
52
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Chief Judge Seth, speaking for the
appellate court, 53 reversed the district court, finding that the city was im-
laterally alter CCC's franchise based on BCC's desire to become the exclusive city-wide cable
television franchisee.
48. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), reads, in pertinent part: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal .... "
49. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 gives cities in Colorado with a population of at least two
thousand people the power to adopt a charter authorizing the city to enact legislation in matters
of local concern. Such legislation supersedes any inconsistent state law. Conrad v. City of
Thornton, 191 Colo. 444, 553 P.2d 822 (1976). Colorado has a very broad home rule provision:
From and after the certifying to and filing with the secretary of state of a charter
framed and approved in reasonable conformity with the provisions of this article, such
city or town and the citizens thereof shall have. . . all other powers necessary, requi-
site or proper for the government and administration of its local and municipal mat-
ters ....
COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
50. Presumably, Boulder's authority to contract with companies and regulate cable televi-
sion within its bounds is based on the Colorado Constitution, which provides authority over
"works or ways local in use and extent. ... Id. at § 1. This provision is made applicable to
home rule cities, other than Denver, through art. XX, § 6 of the Colorado Constitution. A
cable television system must run cable over public ways to operate.
51. 485 F. Supp. at 1039.
52. On July 1, 1980, after both the district court's preliminary injunction against Boulder
and the Tenth Circuit's reversal of that order, the Boulder City Council passed Ordinance 4515.
This ordinance became effective August 21, 1980. It permanently limited CCC's right to ex-
pand cable television service outside of the one-third of the city it had reached prior to July 1,
1980. On August 5, 1980, in the district court, Judge Matsch again issued a preliminary injunc-
tion prohibiting enforcement of the ordinance limiting CCC's growth. See Community Com-
munications Co. v. City of Boulder, No. 80-M-62 (D. Colo. filed Sept. 5, 1980) (memorandum
opinion).
53. According to CCC, the City of Boulder continually stressed the urgency of a decision
from the court of appeals. An initial order, reversing the district court decision, came down one
day after the appellate argument. Supplemental Brief of CCC in Support of Petition for
Rehearing en banc at 2, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th
Cir. 1980), rehearng detid (Oct. 1, 1980). It is interesting to note that the appellate court char-
acterized the proceedings below as involving a request for a temporary restraining order. Com-
munity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d at 705 (10th Cir. 1980). The district
court, however, clearly considered CCC to have moved for a preliminary injunction. 485 F.
[Vol, 58:2
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mune from the reach of the Sherman Act. This conclusion was based upon
the nature of Colorado's constitutional home rule provisions and a recent
Colorado Supreme Court decision, Manor Vail Condominium Association o. Town
of Vail. 54 The court of appeals held that the Manor Vail decision indicated
Colorado's acknowledgment of the local nature of cable television regula-
tion.55 The appellate court reasoned, therefore, that since Boulder's home
rule status entitled the city to legislative preeminence in matters of local
concern, its promulgation of the challenged ordinances was equivalent to
state action. This deduction led Chief Judge Seth to inquire into the city's
actions surrounding the enactment of the cable television ordinances to de-
termine whether they met the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Lafayette
and Mtdca/. In the court's view, Boulder satisfied the two criteria of the state
action antitrust immunity test enunciated in Midcal: Boulder had "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed" a policy on cable television through
its city council transcripts and through the moratorium ordinance. The pol-
icy to halt CCC's growth was "actively supervised by the state," that is, by
the home rule city, through enactment and enforcement of the moratorium
ordinance. Apparently as dictum, the court of appeals found the "govern-
mental" nature of Boulder's involvement in the cable television business sup-
portive of the city's immunity stance.
56
Subsequent to the filing of the majority opinion in Community Communica-
tions, Judge Markey 57 authored a vehement and lengthy dissent. This dis-
sent was grounded upon a first amendment analysis of the city's action
which prevented new listeners and the cable television company from con-
necting. 58 Judge Markey did treat at length the antitrust claim and the
Supp. at 1036. A preliminary injunction is issued after a hearing where notice has been previ-
ously given to the opposing party. In contrast, a temporary restraining order may be issued ex
parte, without an adversary hearing. See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2947 at 426 (1973).
54. 602 P.2d 1168 (Colo. 1980). In this suit, the plaintiff claimed that Vail's rate structure
for its cable television franchise violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the rate structure, for it was not "wholly arbi-
trary" or "invidious discrimination" against the plaintiff, a cable television customer. 604 P.2d
at 1172. No challenge appears to have been made to Vail's authority to regulate the cable
television franchise, nor was the city's right to grant the franchise contested.
55. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d at 706-07 (10th Cir.
1980).
56. See Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 426, and note 37 supra
and accompanying text.
57. Chief Judge Markey, of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sat
by designation. Judge Markey filed a separate dissent more than a month after the majority
opinion was handed down.
58. The plaintiff also had asserted a claim based on the first amendment, because of Boul-
der's restrictions on CCC's ability to reach more listeners. The district court brushed this claim
aside, noting that the first amendment issue was not ripe; however, the court cautioned the city
that its regulations must be carefully articulated to avoid conflict with the first amendment.
485 F. Supp. at 1040.
The nature of the antitrust section of the Tenth Circuit Survey does not permit an exten-
sive treatment of the serious first amendment concerns raised by Judge Markey. The dissent
would have upheld the district court's preliminary injunction because the moratorium on
CCC's future growth appeared to be a "prior restraint" on speech. In the context of this deci-
sion, a "prior restraint" refers to government repression of intended communication. See South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). Judge Markey considered CCC's
activities in carrying programming signals, as opposed to originating programming, to be en-
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immunity defense. Nevertheless, he considered this analysis subordinate to,
albeit supportive of, his first amendment views requiring the preliminary
injunction to be upheld.
59
The dissenting opinion focused on the dictates of the majority decision
in Lafayette. Judge Markey rejected Chief Judge Seth's conclusion that home
rule status cloaked Boulder with the mantle of state action, leading to immu-
nity. Whereas the Supreme Court found no automatic immunity for the
plaintiff-cities in Lafayette,6° the dissent reasoned that the Tenth Circuit ma-
jority's position undermined the Supreme Court's view of state action anti-
trust immunity. Judge Markey could find no Colorado policy on cable
television regulation, nor could he find a state policy of replacing competi-
tion in the cable television business with anticompetitive regulation. 6 1 The
dissent, in agreement with the lower court, concluded that cable television
did not appear to be solely a matter of local concern in light of the Supreme
Court's pronouncement in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,62 which
stated that cable operators were engaged in interstate commerce. Basically,
Judge Markey did not accept the notion that the dictates of federalism,
which spawned the Parker immunity doctrine, placed home rule cities in the
position of sovereign states so as to justify municipal antitrust immunity.
This conclusion seemed especially evident where the state offered no gui-
dance or supervision to the city in dealing with the challenged activity.
A final point of difference between the dissent's view and the majority
opinion concerned the distinction Chief Justice Burger had mentioned in his
concurrence in Lafayette, the distinction between governmental and proprie-
tary activity. Chief Judge Seth found that Boulder's regulation of cable tele-
vision, as opposed to the city's actual operation of that industry, supported
his immunity view. Judge Markey emphasized that Boulder's regulation of
CCC, through an ordinance which was no more than a contract between the
city and CCC, was hardly typical of "governmental" activity.63 Judge Mar-
compassed nonetheless within the protection of the first amendment. Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d at 713 (10th Cir. 1980) (Markey, J., dissenting). The
dissent cited the oft-quoted language of Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969),
that "[i]t is the right of viewers and listeners . . . which is paramount . . . . [Tihe First
Amendment [protects the] marketplace of ideas. . . rather than [give] countenance [to] monop-
olization of that market." Id. at 390. The dissent did not find Boulder's police power concern
for the public ways or its attempt to find a single cable operator for the city to be tantamount to
a compelling governmental interest justifying the first amendment infringement which Judge
Markey perceived.
59. The appellate court has the power to affirm a judgment on grounds not necessarily
relied on by the court below. See 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE 110.25 [1] (2d ed. 1979).
60. Lafayette and Plaquemine, Louisiana, are not home rule cities, although Louisiana's
Constitution does allow a city to adopt a home rule charter. 435 U.S. at 434 n. 15 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
61. In re Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 73 PuB. U. REP. 3D 161, 175 (1968) (Public
Utilities Commission of Colorado refused to regulate cable television until the state legislature
takes action to bring cable operators within the jurisdiction of the commission). Colorado cur-
rently has no statutes or administrative regulations pertaining to cable television.
62. 392 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1968). The Court found CATV systems to be in interstate com-
merce and therefore within the regulatory control of the FCC through the Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1976).
63. Judge Markey echoed the district court's position on the city's manner of regulating
CCC. See 485 F. Supp. at 1039.
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key considered that Chief Justice Burger's Lafayette concurrence was overem-
phasized by the Tenth Circuit court, in disregard of the thrust of both the
majority and plurality sections of the Supreme Court's opinion in Lafayette.
D. The Tenth Circuit. Lost in a Supreme Court Labyrinth
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Community Communications,
reached its conclusion by finding Boulder's home rule status and its lack of
direct participation in the operation of the cable television business to be
highly significant. Combining these facts with a strained interpretation of
the Manor Vail decision, the appellate court was able to conclude that Boul-
der met the two-part test for state action antitrust immunity as set out in the
Supreme Court's latest Parker immunity decision, Midcal. The following
analysis will consider the court's reasoning and conclusions.
Community Communications differs from Lafayette in two respects: Boulder
is regulating rather than operating an industry, and unlike the cities in Lafay-
ette, Boulder has home rule status, giving it preeminence in matters of exclu-
sive local concern vis-A-vis the state. Focusing on the doctrine of home rule
and Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Lafayette, these factors might ap-
pear to justify a result that differs from Lafayette. On a closer analysis of
these tenets of the Tenth Circuit's decision, however, it is clear that their
value in justifying Boulder's antitrust immunity has been greatly overstated.
The appellate court's conclusion, that Boulder's actions in regulating
cable television are tantamount to those of the state, is premised on the no-
tion that cable television is solely a matter of local concern. It is only when a
home rule city in Colorado legislates on an exclusively local matter that the
city has preeminence over contradictory state laws.64 The court's categoriza-
tion of the cable television business as an exclusively local matter fails to take
note of contradictory case law.6 5 Even if it is assumed that such cases are not
apposite, the Tenth Circuit's reliance on the Colorado Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Manor Vail as evidence of the exclusively local nature of cable televi-
sion regulation is misplaced. In Manor Vail, the plaintiff had argued that the
city's rate structure for cable television customers denied it equal protection
of the laws. Vail's ability to franchise a cable television firm and to set rates
was not challenged by the plaintiff and was not mentioned in the opinion.
Assuming that the Colorado Supreme Court, in a proper case, would rule
that Vail had the power to franchise and set cable television rates, this would
not be dispositive of the exclusively local nature of cable television. Colo-
rado has no policy, case law, or statute concerning cable television regula-
tion. Under Colorado law, a home rule city may legislate on matters of state
64. See note 49 supra.
65. Se, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 180-81 (1968) (CATV
deemed an enterprise within interstate commerce and therefore subject to regulatory authority
of the FCC). Cf. TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), afd per cunam, 396
U.S. 556 (1970) (the district court ruled that a CATV system was in interstate commerce; how-
ever, under the preemption doctrine, the state statute regulating CATV as a public utility did
not conflict with the commerce clause) In TV Pir, the lower court commented that CATV's
character was more local than national.
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and local concern in the absence of state law or regulation. 66 Therefore,
granting that Manor Vail stands for the proposition that Colorado home rule
cities may franchise and set rates for cable companies, the decision conclu-
sively proves only the obvious: Colorado has not entered the area of cable
television regulation. There is no support for the view that the Colorado
court would find inconsistent municipal law to take precedence over an ex-
pressed state policy in this area.
Reliance on the Manor Vail decision led the Tenth Circuit court to a
second misconception. This decision dealt with a constitutional challenge to
Vail's regulatory behavior; antitrust issues were not involved. In Community
Communications, Boulder's ability to franchise and set rates for CCC was not
in dispute. The issue was whether the city's allegedly anticompetitive con-
duct was beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. The Manor Vail decision
gave no guidance on the ability of home rule cities to act in an anticompeti-
tive fashion in regulating cable television.
Home rule status fails to be of conclusive significance for another rea-
son. The Lafayette and Midcal decisions are inconsistent with a Parker immu-
nity view that would allow mere home rule activity to equal state action. In
Lafayette, the only Supreme Court decision to focus on the antitrust immu-
nity of municipalities, both the majority and the dissent were aware of the
doctrine of home rule.6 7 However, the Court did not, even in a passing foot-
note, make any reference to a possible distinction in treatment between
home rule cities and those cities with more limited authority. While this
negative conclusion is certainly not dispositive, it bears consideration when
the Midcal Court's latest interpretation of the Parker immunity test is ex-
amined. The dissent in Lafayette had justifiably complained that the plural-
ity's test for antitrust immunity was unclear: that sovereign acts of the states
and their subdivisions are immune when they are "pursuant to state policy to
displace competition. '"68 Justice Stewart, dissenting in Lafayette, was not cer-
tain whether state authonty suffices or whether state compulsion is necessary.
69
If state authority is sufficient, a stronger case for the significance of home
rule might be available. But the Supreme Court's most recent antitrust im-
munity decision, Mdcal, does not allow a general grant of state authority to
provide federal antitrust immunity. Not only must the "challenged restraint
• . . be . . . 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'
. . . [but] the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself.
' 70
Within this succinct test, home rule cities can find no comfort. The Midcal
criteria were created as a template to be placed over the activity of a state as
a means of determining antitrust immunity. Mtdcal points to the focus of all
the Court's antitrust immunity decisions: the state itself must be actively
66. See Greeley Police Union v. City Council, 191 Colo. 419, 553 P.2d 790 (1976); Woolver-
ton v. Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 316 P.2d 982 (1961).
67. 435 U.S. at 408 (plurality opinion) (noting that most counties, municipalities and
townships have broad authority for general governance). Id. at 434-35 n. 15 (dissenting opinion)
(pointing out that petitioner-cities did not have home rule charters, but that Louisiana has a
statutory home rule provision).
68. Id. at 435.
69. Id.
70. 445 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
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involved in the challenged restraint, giving its imprimatur to the allegedly
anticompetitive actions. Colorado has made no provision for cable television
regulation either in its constitutional provision for home rule or in its statutes
and regulations; nor did the Colorado Supreme Court mandate the anticom-
petitive regulation of cable television in Manor Vail, all of which points to a
conclusion at odds with the Tenth Circuit.
The Supreme Court's Midcal opinion clarifies another point of conten-
tion. Chief Justice Burger appears to have abandoned his distinction be-
tween governmental activity and proprietary activity. This 8-0 decision
contains not a word about such a dichotomy. This is particularly telling
because the challenged activities of the State of California in Midcal could
hardly have been more "governmental". The Mdcal case involved a state
program of authorizing and enforcing wine price schedules and fair trade
contracts generated through private agreements.71 The Tenth Circuit's use
of the governmental/proprietary distinction to support its immunity deci-
sion in Community Communications appears inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's present focus.
The Tenth Circuit court seems to have been led astray by focusing on
Boulder's ability to regulate cable television in general. The real issue, how-
ever, concerned the city's ability to act anticompetitively with impunity. If
the issue had been framed in this fashion, Boulder's home rule status and the
city's manner of regulating CCC would have taken their proper place as
secondary considerations. Under the Supreme Court's two most recent
Parker immunity decisions, the threshold inquiry should have been whether
the challenged anticompetitive policy came from the state. Colorado's si-
lence on the ability of its cities to regulate cable television in an anticompeti-
tive fashion should have been dispositive in this case. The Tenth Circuit's
reluctance to follow the Supreme Court's present Parker immunity test is un-
derstandable, however, when the potential impact of this test upon munici-
palities, other political subdivisions, and states is considered. 72  The
following section will briefly discuss the competing concerns that must be
balanced in articulating a test of state action immunity from the antitrust
laws.
E. Federal Expansion Overruns State Sovereignty
Chief Justice Burger, in his concurrence in Lafayette, commented on the
ever-expanding concept of interstate commerce with its concomitant effect of
extending the reach of the antitrust laws. 73 The point is well taken, in light
of the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on subject matter juris-
71. Id.
72. See generally Handler, Antitnsi-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1978); Kennedy, Of
Lawyers, Lightbulbs and Raisins: An Analysis of the State Action Doctrine Under the Antitrust Laws, 74
Nw. U.L. REV. 31 (1979); Posner, The Proper Rationship Between Stte Regulations and the Fedtral
Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1974); Comment, National League of Cities andtMe Parker
Doctnie- 7te Staius of Stale Sooercign( Under Me Commece, Clause, 8 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 301
(1980); Note, The State Action Antloust Defense for Local Covernent. A State Authorization Approach,
12 URB. LAw. 315 (1980).
73. 435 U.S. at 420-22 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
19811
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
diction under the Sherman Act. This decision, McLain v. Real Estate Board of
New Orleans, Inc., extends the purview of the Sherman Act to any defendant
whose effect on interstate commerce is as peripheral as an interstate broker-
age receiving out-of-state financing.
74
The federal expansionist trend has not been limited to the antitrust
laws. Cities no longer can assert the good faith immunity defense in suits
charging them with violating an individual's civil rights under the four-
teenth amendment. 75 Another area of encroachment on the states has oc-
curred through a broad reading of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871.76 The Court has expanded the reach of section 1983 to include private
actions against the states for violations of federal statutory law as well as for
constitutional infringements.
77
In the context of congressional expansion into areas once thought to be
beyond the reach of the national government, the Midcal and Lafayette deci-
sions are not remarkable. The present test of state immunity from the anti-
trust laws, however, fails to strike the proper balance between a national
economic policy and the sovereign functions of states and their political sub-
divisions.
There is little doubt that if every municipality and other political subdi-
vision in this country acted in an anticompetitive manner, motivated by
their own sense of self-interest, economic dislocation and subversion of the
federal antitrust laws would occur. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in
Lafayette expressed a fear of such a distortion of the efficiency of free markets
if the immunity doctrine automatically included state subdivisions. 78 Re-
gardless of how one views the scope of the federal antitrust laws, it is the
present test of state action immunity that fails to consider our federalist sys-
tem.
The plurality in Lafayette did not consider National League of Cities v.
Usey 79 to be relevant to the issue of municipal antitrust immunity.80 In
Usey, a 5-4 majority held that Congress' use of the commerce clause is lim-
ited when federal law attempts to "directly displace the States' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions. . ". ."8' The Court's Parker immunity test may conflict with Usery
when a municipality is sued for anticompetitive behavior in an area that can
be considered a "traditional government function." The Usey decision dem-
onstrates the inherent problem in the Supreme Court's current thinking on
municipal antitrust immunity: compliance with the Midal test may signifi-
cantly interfere in state and local governmental functioning.
74. 444 U.S. 232, 244 (1980). See notes 165-67 ifta and accompanying text.
75. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
77. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
78. 435 U.S. at 407-08.
79. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Use7y invalidated a federal wage law that provided for a mini-
mum wage for state and local government employees. The Court stated that the added expense
of compliance would interfere with the integral operations of the states.
80. 435 U.S. at 412 n.42.
81. 426 U.S. at 852.
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As the dissent in Lafayette pointed out, the Court's antitrust immunity
test does not consider the manner in which states have delegated powers to
municipalities.8 2 States rarely express an anticompetitive policy or supervise
such a policy when they delegate authority to their political subdivisions.
8 3
Thus, most municipal activities initiated before the Lafayette decision will not
be immunized under the Court's present test. One effect of the Court's Mid-
cal and Lafayette tests will be increased state intervention in municipal activi-
ties to ensure compliance with the antitrust immunity test.84 Alternatively,
states may refuse initially to share power with the cities, preferring to avoid
the intimate involvement in municipal affairs necessary to provide antitrust
immunity.8 5 The ability of cities to enact programs that are tailored to the
special needs of their citizenry, or to react to modern problems with innova-
tive solutions may be hampered by a fear of the federal antitrust laws.
8 6
The terror that the treble damages provision 87 produces in the hearts of
antitrust defendants will be equally felt by government defendants involved
in private antitrust suits. It is conceivable that an antitrust damage award
might bankrupt a city. 8 Extremely large damage awards against cities may
directly affect the citizenry by reducing local government programs and
services.8 9 States themselves may suffer financially from antitrust damage
awards if they are forced to bail out bankrupt cities, satisfying the cities'
judgments.
9 0
All of these potential adverse consequences from the Court's present
view of Parker immunity are illustrative of the problems inherent in balanc-
ing the concept of federalism-with its allowance for state sovereignty in our
governmental system-against a national economic policy which extolls free
market enterprise. Alternatives to the current immunity test as articulated
in Mdeal may lie in an equitable defense9 t to treble damages when a munic-
82. 435 U.S. at 434-38 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
83. See generally Vanlandingham, Muncsoal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 269, 280-83 (1968).
84. A recent state statute authorizing New York to participate with New Jersey in the
organization of industrial development projects reflects the impact of the Lafayette decision. The
statute specifically authorizes local governmental anticompetitive behavior. N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAWS § 71
7
1(g) (65) (McKinney 1979).
85. See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). In Lafayette, Justice
Stewart commented on the dearth of state legislative history, making it extremely difficult to
support an argument of legislative intent to provide municipal immunity. 435 U.S. at 436-37
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
86. On the municipal problems inherent in the Court's present Parker immunity doctrine,
see Comment, National League of Cities and the Parker Doctriene The Status of State Sovereignty
Under the Commerce Clause, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 301, 336-42 (1980).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
88. 435 U.S. at 442 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun pointed out that
Louisiana Power & Light Co. sought $540 million in treble damages, amounting to $28,000 per
family, equally divided among the residents of Plaquemine and Lafayette, Louisiana.
89. See Federal Antitrust Immunity. Exposure of Muncalalites to Treble Antitrust Damages Sets
Limit For New Federalism City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 11 CONN. L.
REv. 126, 140 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Federal Antitrust Intmunity].
90. "A recent study revealed that the statutes of 15 states provided for a State receiver or
state agency to act as a receiver when a local government unit defaults on its financial obliga-
tions." ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITY FINANCIAL
EMERGENCIES: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSION 77 (1973).
91. See Federal Antitrust Immu'ny, mupra note 89, at 142.
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ipality is found to have violated the antitrust laws, or in injunctive relief in
lieu of damages. 92 Possibly, as Professor Handler has suggested, 93 municipal
anticompetitive conduct should be left to the states to handle through state
antitrust laws.
However rough the present attempt by the Supreme Court is in striking
the balance and articulating a satisfying Parker immunity test, it is clear that
the test we now have is not ambiguous. The Court and Congress should
each be urged to consider the ramifications of the present immunity test.
Until such time as a new balance is struck, however, federal courts will have
the obligation to adhere to the dictates of Midcal and Lafayette when con-
fronted with municipalities seeking immunity from the antitrust laws.
II. THE BAR TO THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION:
THE "BoYco'TT EXCEPTION" TO THE MCCARRAN ACT
In Card v. National Life Insurance Co. ,94 the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals waded into an area that lately has received an unusual amount of at-
tention from the Supreme Court: the statutory exemption from the antitrust
laws afforded to the insurance industry. 95 The McCarran-Ferguson Act 96
(McCarran Act) excludes from antitrust liability every person or entity in
the "business of insurance,"'97 to the extent that their activity is "regulated
by state law," 98 unless such activity is an act of "boycott, coercion or intimi-
dation."
99
92. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) provides for injunctive relief. Under Section 26, any party in a
private antitrust suit may seek an injunction when injury is alleged under the Sherman or Clay-
ton Acts.
93. Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1388 n.160 (1978). Professor Han-
dler and the Colorado Attorney General's Office took the same position before the National
Commission for the Revision of Antitrust Laws and Procedures. Both expressed the belief that
the states should control anticompetitive state action through state antitrust laws. Id.
94. 603 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1979).
95. Set Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011- 1015 (1976). The Act provides, in relevant part:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the sev-
eral States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or
taxation of such business by the several States.
ld. § 1011. The statute continues:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be sub-
ject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to
the business of insurance: Provid ed, That. . . the Clayton Act, and. . . Federal Trade
Commission Act. . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that
such business is not regulated by State Law.
Id. § 1012. The McCarran Act further provides:
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inap-
plicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion,
or intimidation.
Id. § 1013.
97. Id. § 1011.
98. Id. § 1012(b).
99. Id. § 1013(b).
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Congress passed the McCarran Act in 1945 in response to a precedent-
setting decision by the Supreme Court in United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Association,' ° ° which held, for the first time, that the business of insur-
ance was an activity in interstate commerce.10 ' Congress and the dissenting
justices in South-Eastern Underwriters feared that this extension of federal
power under the commerce clause would invalidate state regulation of the
insurance industry because of the preemption doctrine. 10 2 The McCarran
Act's main thrust was to allow state regulation and taxation of the insurance
industry. 10 3 The insurance industry exemption from the federal antitrust
laws was added as a proviso.
10 4
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Card did not concern the McCarran Act
as a whole; the opinion only discussed the scope of the term "boycott," as
used in the Act. Before discussing the phrase "boycott, coercion or intimida-
tion" as contained in the McCarran Act, it should be understood that a
defendant in an antitrust suit who asserts the McCarran Act's exemption
need only prove that it is indeed in the "business of insurance," and that the
activity that has been challenged as a restraint of trade is "regulated by state
law." The meaning of both these phrases has been scrutinized by federal
courts to determine the scope of such broad language.' 0 5 If a plaintiff is to
successfully negate a defendant's McCarran Act antitrust exemption, he
must show that the defendant, who has met the McCarran Act's require-
ments, has boycotted, coerced or intimidated the plaintiff. Such a showing
100. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
101. The South-Eastern Underwrzters decision reversed a seventy-five year old precedent estab-
lished in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), which had declared insurance not to be
"a transaction of commerce." Id. at 183.
102. Federal preemption, through the supremacy clause, is imposed sparingly today. State
law will be deemed invalid where it conflicts with federal law, City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); or when Congress has clearly decided to so occupy an area
by regulation that even consistent state law will be declared invalid, Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). At the time of the passage of the McCarran
Act, the preemption doctrine was thought to have a broader scope than it does today; thus,
federal regulation of insurance could have invalidated even consistent state law. See Sullivan &
Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments.- Defming The Scope ofExemptons, Expanding Coverage and Ref)5-
ing the Rule ofReason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 265, 270-71 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Recent Antitrust
Developments].
103. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976).
105. In SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), the Court outlined those activities
which fall within the "business of insurance": "[T]he fixing of rates... the selling and adver-
tising of policies . . . , the licensing of companies and their agents . . . , [tihe relationship
between insurer and insured, the type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpreta-
tion and enforcement--these [are] the core of the 'business of insurance.'" Id. at 459-60. Re-
cently, in Group & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), the Court held that
petitioner's agreements with pharmacies, to make it attractive for policyholders to patronize
pharmacies that limited their profit margins on drug sales, did not qualify as "the business of
insurance." For other cases defining this phrase, see Nedrow, The McCarran Controvers." Insurance
and the Antitrust Law, 12 CONN. L. REv. 205, 210-45 (1980).
The requirement that insurance be "regulated by state law" to avoid antitrust liability, 15
U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976), is met by a general authorization or prohibition of "certain standards
of conduct." California League of Ind. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp.
857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959). A general scheme of regulation which failed to specifically include
the defendant's challenged restraint was, nonetheless, said to meet the "regulated by state law"
test in Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971).
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has been called the "boycott exception"' 6 to the McCarran Act.
Before the Supreme Court's decision in St. Paul Fire & Martne Insurance
Co. v. Barry,'0 7 the federal courts had been polarized over their interpreta-
tion of the boycott language in the McCarran Act. The first federal court to
define the boycott language took a narrow view, considering that only the
"blacklisting" of insurance companies or agents by a group of insurers was
sufficient to meet the boycott exception.' 0 8 Both the Fifth and Ninth Cir-
cuits adopted such a view.109 Other circuits, however, have found that the
boycott exception extends to any boycotting conduct that would violate the
Sherman Act."10 The usual definition of a boycott, within the prohibitions
of the Sherman Act, is any concerted action to exclude a competitor from
the market. " ' I
In Barry, the Court settled this conflict at its extremes, but left the mid-
dle latitudes open to lower court interpretation. The Supreme Court was
faced with the issue of whether the McCarran boycott exception applied to
disputes between policyholders and insurers. Justice Powell, writing for the
Court, resoundingly answered in the affirmative."t 2 The respondents, plain-
tiffs below, were physicians who brought a class action suit against the four
insurers who carried medical malpractice insurance in the state where-the
physicians practiced. Allegedly, these insurers had conspired so that three of
the companies refused to deal with the physicians; thus, the doctors were
forced to seek coverage from the fourth insurer, and that company had
changed the rules of coverage to favor insurers.' 13 The Court made clear
that it was deciding only whether the insurers were acting to "boycott" the
physicians within the "boycott exception" to the McCarran Act. There was
no issue as to whether the insurers' acts were related to the business of insur-
106. The phrase "boycott, coercion and intimidation" will be referred to merely as the
"boycott exception", since courts appear to treat these terms synonymously. See, e.g., United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533, 535-36 (1944). Setalso Recent Antitrt
Developments, supra note 102, at 278 n.59.
107. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
108. Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261 F. Supp. 12 (D. Or. 1966). This court came
to its definition of "boycott" based upon the legislative history. See 91 CONG. REC. 1087 (1945)
(remarks of Rep. Allen).
109. See, e.g., Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975); Addrisi v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974).
110. See, e.g., Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
vacatedfor reconsideration tn light ofGroup Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205
(1979), at 440 U.S. 942 (1979); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d
841 (2d Cir. 1963) (dictum), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964).
111. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRusT, § 83 at 229 (1977). A group
boycott to exclude a competitor from the market is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Some activities are considered
to be so economically egregious as to be per se unreasonable, and therefore, violative of section 1
of the Sherman Act. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 401 (1927) (price
fixing). Not all concerted refusals to accede to the demands of a trader in the market are per se
violations of section 1. E.g., Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n., 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966) (PGA's rules for participation in golf tournaments, while excluding
Deesen, were a reasonable restraint to aid in the management of the professional sport).
112. 438 U.S. at 552-55. Justice Stewart filed a dissent in which Justice Rehnquist joined.
d. at 555.
113. Id. at 535.
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ance, or whether the state regulated that business.1 4 Justice Powell defined
a boycott in generic terms as "a method of pressuring a party with whom
one has a dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to withhold, patronage
or services from the target."' 15 The Court stated that "the term 'boycott' is
not limited to concerted activity against insurance companies or agents or,
more generally, against competitors of members of the boycotting group."'
16
The Court, however, did stop short of the more expansive reading of the
term adopted by some lower courts. The majority held that a "boycott"
within the McCarran Act is not synonymous with all activity that constitutes
a per se violation of the Sherman Act."i 7 Almost as an afterthought, Justice
Powell reminded the parties that the threshold inquiry in a charge of boycott
is that there is concerted activity; an individual actor alone cannot "boy-
cott." The boycott exception now encompasses concerted action against pol-
icyholders. The Court has left unanswered the question of to what extent
conduct beyond concerted action against insurers, agents, or policyholders
will come within the definition of "boycott."
The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Card v. National Life Insurance Co.
is consistent with the Supreme Court's general premise that a boycott is con-
certed activity to withhold "patronage or services from the target."'1 8 The
plaintiffs in Card, a general insurance agent and the corporation he headed,
charged a life insurance company (National Life), a broker-dealer, 1 9 and
employees of the life insurance firm' 20 with a section 1 Sherman Act viola-
tion. Card contended that these defendants and National Life's general
agents association had conspired together to terminate Card's general
agency contract with National Life. 12 1 The defendants asserted that Card
was terminated because he had violated his contract by seeking another gen-
eral agency agreement with a competing insurer. In the district court, the
defendants affirmatively pleaded that the McCarran Act exempted them
from Sherman Act liability. The lower court agreed and granted summary
judgment for the defendants.' 22 The trial court based its conclusion prima-
rily on the plaintiffs failure to show concerted activity aimed at harming
114. Id. at 540 n.9.
115. Id. at 541.
116. Id. at 552.
117. Id. at 545 n. 18. Business activities that are traditionally considered per se unreasonable
and therefore violative of the antitrust laws are: price fixing, horizontal division of markets,
resale price maintenance, and group boycotts. 2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTrrRusT LAW
§ 9.20, at 57-58 (1980).
118. 438 U.S. at 541.
119. Equity Services, Inc., the broker-dealer, was not a party to the appeal. The district
court held that Equity Services was not in the business of insurance and could not seek exemp-
tion from suit under the McCarran Act. Card v. National Life Ins. Co., No. 74-446 (D. Colo.
Dec. 9, 1977) (mem.).
120. Lawrence Leyland, executive vice-president of National Life Insurance Co. and Wil-
liam Ryan, a general agent for National Life Insurance Co., were both dismissed from the suit
by the district court's order of August 6, 1974. Brief for Appellee at 2, Card v. National Life Ins.
Co., 603 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1979).
121. 603 F.2d at 829.
122. The district court and the plaintiffs agreed that, for purposes of the McCarran Act, the
defendants were in the "business of insurance" and defendants' activities were regulated by the
State of Colorado. Id. at 832.
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Card;1 23 secondarily, the district court found that National Life's termina-
tion of Card lacked the qualities of a "boycott": it was not a systematic
exclusion from the marketplace.1
24
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court.1 2
5 The Tenth Circuit
court placed the main emphasis on the boycott issue rather than on the issue
of concerted action. Judge Doyle, speaking for the court, held that under
either a narrow view' 26 or an expansive view' 2 7 of the meaning of "boycott"
in the McCarran Act, the defendants' conduct did not disqualify them from
the Act's antitrust exemption. t 28 The appellate court confirmed the lower
court's view of concerted activity, finding that all of the defendants were a
part of National Life Insurance Co.
The court of appeals did not choose to define the scope of the McCar-
ran Act boycott exception. The appellate court viewed this complaint as a
breach of contract action. National Life alleged that Card was dismissed for
entering into a general agency agreement with another life insurance com-
pany in violation of National Life's rules. Judge Doyle did not perceive how
Card's termination of employment could amount to a boycott.
The Card decision is consistent with other federal court decisions on sim-
ilar facts. i29 Aside from the issue of the propriety of insurance companies
having an exemption from the antitrust laws, 130 the Tenth Circuit's opinion
in Card upholds the integrity of the meaning of "boycott" in the antitrust
lexicon. I31
123. The boycott claim focused on National Life, an agent/employee of that firm, and an
association of National Life's agents, which was not a named defendant in the suit. The district
judge found that among these defendants, there were no two separate parties capable of acting
in a concerted fashion. See the discussion of intra-enterprise conspiracy at notes 182-84 infra
and accompanying text.
124. Brief for Appellee at 19, Card v. National Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1979).
125. Judge McKay concurred, but only so far as the majority opinion affirmed the district
court's conclusion that the defendants had exhibited no concerted action. 603 F.2d at 834.
126. See notes 108-109 supra and accompanying text.
127. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
128. 603 F.2d at 832-33.
129. Black v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 458 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aj'd, 571 F.2d
571 (3d Cir. 1978); Blackley v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc. [1976-2] Trade Cas. 69,787 (D. Utah
1976).
130. See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCE-
DURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 244-45 (1979) (calling for
the repeal of the McCarran Act; anticompetitive activities of insurance companies that are pro-
tected by the Act are not considered by the Commission to be essential to the survival of insur-
ance companies).
131. It is interesting to note that, assuming the presence of concerted activity in Card, the
facts alleged at the preliminary hearing bear considerable similarity to cases where judges have
found such behavior to be reasonable. See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian
Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). In Hawaiian
Oke, two distillers, which had used the same distributor and were both dissatisfied with his
performance, agreed to terminate his contract and replace him with another distributor. The
Ninth Circuit could not find this action unreasonable per se because the distillers had not co-
erced the terminated distributor's market conduct; the exclusion of competition was merely
incidental to the distillers' agreement to transfer their business. Similarly, in Molinas v. NBA,
190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), the concerted activity of the NBA in excluding Molinas for
gambling was not a per se violation, and indeed, was considered reasonable.
A Tenth Circuit decision reminiscent of the facts in Card, although in another context, is
Farnell v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1978). In Fame/I, the plaintiff
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III. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ANTITRUST DEFENDANTS
The thorny area of contribution among antitrust violators, with its mul-
tidimensional considerations and policy arguments, 132 was broached by the
Tenth Circuit court in Olson Farns, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 133 The issue of
contribution among antitrust defendants has been hotly contested of late,
both by scholars 134 and by the federal courts.135 The genesis of this conflict
can be traced to the fact that antitrust defendants are subject to joint and
several liability for the treble damages possible under section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act.' 36 Since Congress has made no provision in regard to contribution
in the antitrust laws, 13 7 defendants in an antitrust litigation have had to
was fired from his newspaper management position because of insubordination. Farnell had
refused to cease selling newspapers independently, in violation of company policy. The court of
appeals held that he lacked standing to bring a Sherman Act or a Clayton Act complaint, for
under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), Farnell could not show injury "by
reason of" anything in the antitrust laws. For a discussion of the standing requirements for suits
under the antitrust laws, see notes 169-70 infra and accompanying text.
132. An analysis of the competing policy considerations concomitant to a right of contribu-
tion in suits under the antitrust laws is beyond the scope of this survey. Several of these policy
concerns will be discussed, however, in the context of the Tenth Circuit's contribution decision.
For a significant and thoughtful analysis of the contribution issue in antitrust law, in general,
and a critical assessment of the Tenth Circuit's views, in particular, see Note, Contribution and
Antitrust Policy, 78 MICH. L. REV. 890 (1980).
133. [1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699 (10th Cir. 1979), reheang en bane granted, No. 77-2068 (10th
Cir. Dec. 27, 1979) (Olson Farms ). A companion case, decided on the same day, achieved the
same result. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Countryside Farms, Inc., No. 78-1773 (10th Cir., Nov. 8,
1979) (Olson Farms 11). Olson Farms I stemmed from an antitrust conspiracy suit, alleging that
Olson Farms and Oakdell Egg Farms, Inc. had conspired to price-fix and to monopolize the
purchase of eggs from fourteen producers. Olson Farms was found liable for damages, but only
an injunction issued against Oakdell Farms. The jury verdict was affirmed in Cackling Acres,
Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
Olson Farms II, based on the same complaint as Olson Farms I, covered damages subse-
quently incurred as a result of continued antitrust violations. The defendants in Olson Farms II
have entered a settlement, accompanied by an order of dismissal with prejudice. Olson Farms
II, No. 78-1773, slip op. at 4 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 1979). The appeal in Olson Farms Ylconcerned
the district court's dismissal of Olson Farm's cross-claim against Egg Products Co., Snow White
Egg Co., Countryside Farms, Inc., and a third-party complaint against Safeway Stores, Inc., all
for contribution or indemnity. The court of appeals found the arguments it had set forth in
Olson Farms Icompelling in the companion decision. Judge Holloway, as he did in Olson Farms
1, concurred only in the denial of indemnity, finding the Eighth Circuit's decision in Profes-
sional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979),
persuasive on the issue of contribution.
134. See generally Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in Private Actions Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 33 Sw. L. J. 779 (1979); Note, Contribution Among Antitrust Violators, 29 CATH. U.
L. REV. 669 (1980); Note, Contribution in PnateAntitrustActions, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1540 (1980);
Note, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants, 33 VAND. L. REV. 979 (1980).
135. Compare Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d
1179 (8th Cir. 1979) (joint antitrust tortfeasors have a right of contribution) and Heizer Corp. v.
Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979) (approving of Professional Beauty Supply in dictum) with
Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted
sub nom., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 351 (1980) (contribution un-
available to antitrust violators) and Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614, 616 (3d Cir. 1960)
(contribution declared unavailable to antitrust violators in dictum).
136. See City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks, 127 F. 23 (6th Cir. 1903),
aft'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). A violation of the antitrust laws is considered a tort. See Vines v.
General Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J.).
137. Unlike the antitrust laws, the federal securities laws provide for contribution in certain
instances. See The Securities Act of 1933, § 11(0, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976) (false registration
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argue the equity of their position.
Only one federal appellate court has decreed that there exists an equita-
ble right to contribution among antitrust violators. In Professional Beauty Sup-
po, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc.,138 the Eighth Circuit held that
antitrust defendants are entitled to pro rata contribution, when, on a case-by-
case determination, the trier of fact finds contribution appropriate.139 The
litigation in Professional Beauty Supply arose from a section 2 Sherman Act
complaint charging National Beauty Supply (National) with attempting or
conspiring to monopolize the beauty supplies market. La Maur, Inc., a
manufacturer of beauty supplies, was brought into the suit by National on a
third-party complaint for contribution. National allegedly prompted La
Maur to terminate Professional Beauty Supply's franchise with La Maur
and to grant National an exclusive dealership. The district court had dis-
missed the third-party complaint for contribution based on rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court reviewed only this
12(b)(6) dismissal.
The Eighth Circuit court in Professional Beauty Supply stressed the fair-
ness that is implicit in a right to contribution' 40 and rejected the five argu-
ments La Maur adduced against such a right. 14 1 These arguments,
considered germane by most courts, 142 are: 1) Congress provided for contri-
bution in the securities laws;1 43 therefore, congressional silence on the right
of contribution in the antitrust laws demonstrates a legislative intent to ex-
clude this right; 2) contribution will cause plaintiffs to lose control of their
lawsuits through the defense tactic of impleading numerous third-party de-
fendants; 3) contribution may deter settlement; 4) antitrust litigation is in-
herently complex and contribution can only further such complexity; and 5)
contribution would vitiate the deterrent effect of placing the burden of treble
damages on one antitrust violator. The Eighth Circuit court answered these
arguments by focusing upon two points. The appellate court asserted that
federal courts could handle the added complexity of contribution through
the prudent use of severance. Furthermore, the Professional Beauty Supply
court found that there was no proof that the concentration of the treble
damage award on one of several possible violators was any more of a deter-
rent than spreading damages among all of them.44
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has chosen a route different from
statement); The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976) (willful ma-
nipulation of security prices); and The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 18(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r(b) (1976) (filing a misleading statement with SEC). See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc.
v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1979), for cases citing a federal
common law right of contribution in specific instances. In addition, for a list of most of the
states that have either enacted a right to contribution or promulgated such a right through state
court decisions, see Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contnlbution in iivate Actions Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 33 Sw. L. J. 779, 786 nn.49-51 (1979).
138. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
139. Id. at 1182, 1186.
140. Id. at 1185.
141. Id. at 1183.
142. See note 134 supra.
143. See note 137 supra.
144. 594 F.2d at 1188.
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that of the Eighth Circuit. In Olson Farms I, the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Olson Farms' request for a declara-
tory judgment which sought contribution or indemnity
145 from Safeway
Stores and others.1 46 Olson Farms had been adjudged liable in a price-
fixing conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act and for conspiracy to
monopolize under section 2147 of that Act. Oakdell Farms, a co-conspirator,
only suffered the issuance of an injunction. Olson Farms, in collusion with
many other egg buyers, had induced egg producers to sell eggs to the con-
spirators at a depressed price. Olson Farms paid a judgment of almost $2.5
million. 148 This figure was obtained by trebling all the damages suffered by
the egg producer-plaintiffs, including damages incurred from sales to con-
spiring buyers not party to the suit.'
4 9
In the Tenth Circuit's decision, the court of appeals considered the
three arguments relied on by Olson Farms in seeking a right of contribution:
1) federal decisions have created a common law right to contribution in par-
ticular instances; 150 2) there is a federal common law right to contribution in
rule 1Ob-5 suits; 15 1 and 3) the Eighth Circuit's decision in Professional Beauty
Supply mandates a right to contribution.
The appellate court, addressing the contribution issue, found that Olson
145. As an alternative to contribution from its co-conspirators, Olson Farms sought indem-
nification. The indemnification claim was framed as a demand for the damages Olson Farms
had paid that were attributable to its co-conspirators. The Tenth Circuit previously had com-
mented that such a demand was inconsistent with the nature of indemnification-a desire to be
compensated for all damages. Thomas v. Malco Refiners, Inc., 214 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir.
1954). Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit court addressed the issue of indemnification. A party
adjudged liable for damages may seek indemnification if its liability is the result of a legal
relationship to the actual wrongdoer. Tortious conduct that is imputed, vicarious, or construc-
tive may give rise to indemnification. See United Airlines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 398-99 (9th
Cir. 1964). Olson Farms, as an intentional tortfeasor, with no legal relationship to its co-con-
spirators, was denied indemnification. [1979-2] Trade Gas. at 79,704.
146. Judge Holloway, in concurrence, did not accept the majority's position on contribu-
tion, finding Professiona/ Beauty Supp/y compelling. The damages that Olson Farms had paid
amounted to $2,405,580 with accrued interest. When Judge Holloway compared this amount
to the damages actually attributable to Olson Farms, $99,656 (trebled, this amounted to
$298,968), the inequity in denying contribution became apparent. The other egg buyers in-
volved in the conspiracy were unjustly enriched by the denial of contribution.
147. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) makes it unlawful for "[any] person
• . . [to] monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States .
Id.
148. The judgment was for $1,950,827.23. Olson Farms subsequently paid the judgment,
which, with interest, totaled more than $2,400,000.
149. The untrebled amount was calculated by including the damages incurred by the egg
producers from sales to Olson Farms, Safeway Stores, Inc., Egg Products Co., Snow White Egg
Co., Countryside Farms, Inc., and Gusto Marketing Systems, Inc. The jury whose verdict was
upheld in Cackling Acres did not specifically find that these other buyers were liable; however,
the court of appeals in Olson Farms I found such an inference reasonable. [ 1979-2] Trade Cas. at
79,700 n.4.
150. The court mentioned Olson Farms' reference to Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504
F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) (unintentional tortfeasor has right of
contribution). [1979-2] Trade Cas. at 79,701.
151. In DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), modifid on other
graundrs, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970), a federal district court held that a violator of rule lOb-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1978), could seek contribution. There is provision for this right in other
sections of the securities laws. See note 137 supra.
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Farms' status as an "intentional" tortfeasor weighed heavily against it.
15 2
The decision in Sabre Sh'ppig Corp. V. American President Lies,
5 3 which had
vigorously denied a right of contribution to an intentional tortfeasor, was a
persuasive precedent to the court of appeals. The Tenth Circuit court, in
analyzing the majority and dissenting opinions of the Professional Beauty Sup-
p/y decision, was impressed by the substantial competing concerns present in
the conflict over contribution. The court further noted that most states that
provide a right to contribution among joint tortfeasors do so by statute.
The Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Wilson P Abraham Construction Corp.
v. Texas Industries, Inc. 154 paralleled the Tenth Circuit's reflections on the
contribution dilemma. This Fifth Circuit holding provided the appellate
court with the final impetus to decide to await congressional action, rather
than to create by judicial fiat a right of contribution among antitrust viola-
tors. 155
152. Olson Farms, while claiming that it was a passive antitrust violator, was adjudged
guilty of attempting to and conspiring to monopolize; both charges require a showing of specific
intent. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953)
(attempt to monopolize); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1944),
af'd, 328 U.S. 781, 808-09 (1946) (conspiracy to monopolize).
Olson Farms claimed that it was a passive violator because some courts have been willing
to allow contribution between unintentional tortfeasors. E.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,
504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975). The early common law rule on
contribution came from Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799), which denied
the right of contribution to an intentional tortfeasor. By the twentieth century, the American
courts had, for the most part, glossed over Merryweather's actual holding and denied contribution
in both intentional and negligent torts. Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 196
U.S. 217 (1905). See Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in Private Actions Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 33 Sw. L. J. 779, 781-84 (1979).
153. 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Using the term "unintentional" to describe
the actions of an antitrust violator is bound to cause confusion. In tort liability, one who acts
with intent desires "to bring about a result which will invade the interests of another in a way
that the law will not sanction." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 8 at 31 (4th
ed. 1971). Obversely, an unintentional or negligent act is done by one who knows the danger to
be a foreseeable risk and not a substantial certainty. Id. at 32. It is difficult to conceive of an
unintentional antitrust violation, especially when section 1 of the Sherman Act is involved; one
who conspires, contracts, or combines to restrain trade can hardly be said, as a matter of law,
not to know of the harmful effect involved. See Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in
Private Actions Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 33 Sw. L. J. 779, 792-93 (1979). Cf Comment,
Contribution in Private Antitrust Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 682 (1978) (the author suggests a right
of contribution for unintentional violators of the antitrust laws, but never explains how one can
be an unintentional antitrust violator). Possibly, the line of demarcation between unintentional
and intentional antitrust violators is drawn at the point where a defendant's conduct is no
longer judged by a per se standard and must instead be unreasonable to constitute a violation of
the antitrust laws.
154. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. grantedsub nom., Texas Indus., Inc. v. RadcliffMateri-
als, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 351(1980).
155. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a petition for a rehearing en bans in Olson
Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-21 Trade Cas. 79,699 (10th Cir. 1979), in No. 77-2068
(10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1979). The rehearing was held on September 16, 1980.
It appears that the United States Supreme Court will soon decide the issue of contribution
among antitrust violators. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, without published opinion, a denial of
contribution rights in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.),
a ffg 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex. 1979). A petition for certiorari had been granted sub nom.
Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980). Subsequently, certiorari was
dismissed, Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 101 S. Ct. 311(1980). The Court has recently
granted, however, the petition for certiorari filed in the Abraham Construction case, 604 F.2d 897
ANTITRUST
IV. INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND THE SHERMAN ACT
The decision in Crane v. Intermouilain Health Care, Inc. 156 turned upon the
jurisdictional requirement of interstate commerce under the Sherman
Act. ' 57 The Tenth Circuit court affirmed 158 the district court's 12(b)(1) dis-
missal, reasoning that the plaintiff's antitrust complaint failed to disclose
that the defendants' restraint had a "substantial effect on interstate com-
merce." 1
59
The plaintiff Crane, a pathologist, complained that the defendants had
conspired to prevent him from performing pathological services at Cotton-
wood Hospital, a facility owned and operated by Intermountain Health
Care. In Crane's allegation of boycott, he charged that the defendants had
restrained the practice of pathology at the hospital, as well as inhibited his
own practice.
The court of appeals based its decision upon a prior Tenth Circuit case
involving a similar situation. In Wolf v. Jane Phllips Episcopal Memorial Medi-
cal Center,160 the complaint asserted that the plaintiff, an osteopath, and all
other local osteopaths had been denied the opportunity to join the medical
staff of the local hospitals, and were therefore unable to admit patients to
those hospitals. The Tenth Circuit court held that the complaint showed
only an insubstantial effect on interstate commerce. The court in Wolfcon-
sidered that the goods and services which the hospitals had purchased in
interstate commerce were irrelevant to the plaintiff's showing of Sherman
Act jurisdiction. The defendants' alleged actions did not restrain their
purchases in interstate commerce, nor was it demonstrated that the plain-
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. granled sub noma., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct.
351(1980).
Another contribution case, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 606 F.2d
1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cer. granied 100 S. Ct. 3008(1980), will be decided this term. Northwest
At/hnes raises the issue of contribution in an employment discrimination suit brought under
section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
156. [1980-11 Trade Cas. 77,593 (10th Cir. 1980), rehearing en bancgranted, No. 78-1346 (10th
Cir. Sept. 16, 1980).
157. The modern notions of Congress' authority under the commerce clause stem from
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942). From the time of this watershed decision, federal
power has been expanded by a broadening of the interpretation of interstate commerce to in-
clude activities which have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The interstate com-
merce requirement differs between actions brought under the Sherman Act and those brought
under the Clayton Act. The Sherman Act speaks to "restraint[s] of trade or commerce among
the several states"; thus a substantial effect on commerce meets the Sherman Act's jurisdictional
requirement. See Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 435 U.S. 738, 743 (1976).
A stricter jurisdictional standard pertains to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), since it
encompasses "person[s] or activities [that are] within thefw of interstate commerce." Gulf Oil
Co. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974) (emphasis added). Unlike the Sherman Act,
the Clayton Act dictates that the Act is violated only when one is engaged in interstate com-
merce generally, and has restrained trade during the course of interstate commerce. See J. VON
KAuNOWSKI, 16A ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, §§ 12.03-12.03[2] (1979).
158. Judge McKay concurred only in the result. Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.,
[1980-1] Trade Cas. 77,593, 77,596 (10th Cir. 1980) (McKay, J., concurring).
159. Id. When there is an effect on interstate commerce that is substantial and adverse,
subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act will attach. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc.
v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948).
160. 513 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1975).
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tiff's purchases from interstate commerce had been substantially reduced.
The court's conclusion was that the practice of medicine was wholly an in-
trastate activity. 161
The Tenth Circuit panel in Crane felt that Wolfcompelled the court to
follow precedent until such time as an en banc court reconsidered their stance
regarding medical services and the Sherman Act's jurisdictional require-
ment. The court of appeals has decided to reconsider its position in Crane,1
6 2
a decision possibly prompted by the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Mc-
Lain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc. 163 The Crane panel had cited the
Fifth Circuit's McLain decision, a decision that the Supreme Court subse-
quently reversed.164
In McLain, the plaintiffs asserted that various real estate brokers, firms,
and trade associations had conspired to fix real estate commissions on the
sale of residential property, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found the
defendants' activities to be local in nature and without a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. In reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court held
that the plaintiffs could show Sherman Act jurisdiction by "demonstrat[ing]
a substantial effect on interstate commerce generated by respondents' bro-
kerage activity."' 16 5 The Court concluded that it was unnecessary to show
"that the unlawful conduct itselfhad an effect on interstate commerce."'1 6 6
The amount of out-of-state funds that flowed into New Orleans to finance
residential properties met the interstate commerce test which the Court had
enunciated.
The ripples from the McLain decision may permit the Sherman Act to
extend to almost all business activities. Realistically, the Court's only cur-
rent limitation on jurisdiction under the Sherman Act is that a defendant
whose activities have an insubstantial effect on interstate commerce is be-
yond the purview of the Act.1 67 Considering the Supreme Court's view of
the interstate commerce requirement of the Sherman Act, the Tenth Cir-
cuit's en banc review of Crane may possibly lead to a reversal of the panel's
decision.
V. CASE DIGESTS
A. Comet Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. E A. Cowen Construction, Inc. 168
Section 4 of the Clayton Act 169 is a familiar citation to any party in an
161. The Tenth Circuit court came to the same conclusion in Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. v.
Cleere, 197 F.2d 125, 126 (10th Cir. 1952).
162. A rehearing en bane was held on September 16, 1980.
163. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
164. McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 583 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1978), vacaed,
444 U.S. 232 (1980).
165. 444 U.S. at 242.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 246.
168. 609 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1980).
169. Section 4 of the Clayton Act states:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
[Vol. 58:2
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antitrust suit, for it contains the ominous treble damages provision of the
antitrust laws.1 70 Section 4 also contains the standing requirement for all
violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.17 1 The prerequisite of antitrust
standing is that the plaintiff must have been injured in his "business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."' 172 While this
condition precedent appears simple to apply, federal courts have created a
body of antitrust standing law 113 that is the antithesis of this succinct stand-
ing statute. 174
The Tenth Circuit has been consistent in its decisions concerning anti-
trust standing, always equating the "by reason of" language in section 4
with a proximate cause showing of an antitrust injury. 17 5 The Tenth Cir-
cuit's analytical treatment of antitrust standing, however, has not dissipated
the confusion present in this area of the law.
In Comet Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. EA. Cowen Construction, Inc. ,176 the
Tenth Circuit court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment
to the defendants. The plaintiff, a construction subcontractor, alleged that
the defendants had conspired to inflate bids for the construction of public
buildings in order to force subcontractors and suppliers to pay a "kickback"
to the Governor of Oklahoma. The plaintiff alleged that E.A. Cowen Con-
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, with-
out respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
170. Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976) defines the "antitrust laws" to
include the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1976).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). For the text, see note 169 supra.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. Two main problems in antitrust standing have concerned 1) the type of plaintiff who
may bring suit, and 2) the interjection into standing analysis of a proximate cause test based-on
the section 4 Clayton Act language requiring the injury to occur "by reason ofanything forbidden
in the antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) (emphasis added).
As to the first problem, courts have taken two views. Courts have looked to the "target" of
the alleged violation to determine whether the plaintiff is within the "area of the economy
which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry." Con-
ference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. dented, 342 U.S.
919 (1952). Alternatively, courts have examined the nature of the plaintiff's business or rela-
tionship to the defendant. Eg., Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 935 (1976) (corporate officer, as an employee of company injured by antitrust violation,
lacked standing); Nationwide Auto Appraisers Serv., Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382
F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967) (franchisor had no standing to sue for injury to franchise).
The interjection of proximate cause into antitrust standing has led some courts to decide
the merits of an antitrust complaint under a standing analysis based exclusively on pretrial
information. E.g., Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 522 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976). The confusion created by this approach has prompted
leading authorities in the area to express concern over the analytical techniques employed. Ber-
ger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standng, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 835-40 (1977).
174. See generally Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE
L.J. 809 (1977); Tyler, Private Antitrust Litigation The Problem of Standing, 49 U. OF COLO. L. REV.
269 (1978); Comment, Standing to Sue Under Section ofthe Clayton Act. irect Injury, Target Area, or
Twilight Zone, 47 Miss. L.J. 502 (1976).
175. See Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1979); Farnell v. Albuquerque
Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1978); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Nationwide Auto Appraisers Serv., Inc. v. Associa-
tion of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967).
176. 609 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1980).
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
struction, the successful bidder, had granted Comet Mechanical Contractors,
the plaintiff, a subcontract by oral promise, then reneged when Comet re-
fused to contribute to the kickback. The district court stated that the plain-
tiff lacked standing to sue; the court of appeals agreed.
177
The Tenth Circuit court conceded that Comet had been injured in its
"business or property" as that term is defined in section 4 of the Clayton Act.
The plaintiff lacked standing, however, because it could not meet the "by
reason of" requirement of section 4, a test that the court had articulated in
Reibert v. Atlantic Richfild Co. 178 The Reibert court created two conjunctive
requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to comply with the "by
reason of" language of section 4: "1) there [must be] a causal connection
between an antitrust violation and an injury sufficient to establish the viola-
tion as a substantial factor in the occurrence of the damage; and 2) ...the
illegal act [must be] linked to a plaintiff engaged in activities intended to be
protected by the antitrust laws."' 79 The court of appeals determined that
Comet had failed to meet the second prong of the Reibert test. Comet failed
this test for two reasons. The plaintiff was not a bidder in the relevant mar-
ket, which the appellate court defined as the market in general construction
contracts. The court further held that even in the subcontract market, the
alleged bribe was unrelated to an antitrust violation. No allegation of a con-
spiracy to restrain competition in securing subcontracts had been made.
The aspect of Comet's complaint which, of its own force, should have
been fatal to the plaintiff's cause was the lack of a nexus between the alleged
request for money to further a bribe and any substantive violation of the
antitrust laws. It appears that the complaint failed to state an antitrust vio-
lation. The court's focus on standing only obscures and confuses the merits
of the case. The Tenth Circuit is not alone in this approach to standing.' 80
Nonetheless, there is a need for all circuits to reevaluate their antitrust stand-
ing doctrines-to separate substantive law from standing requirements-so
that neither fatally intertwines with the other.
B. Skyview Distributing, Inc. v. Mller Brewing Co. 181
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals treated the issue of concerted ac-
tion under section 1 of the Sherman Act in Skyv'ew Distributing, Inc. v. Miller
Brewing Co. The appellate court reversed the district court's 12(b)(6) dismis-
sal, finding that the complaint adequately alleged a combination or conspir-
acy in restraint of trade within section 1 of the Sherman Act. Skyview had
been a distributor of Miller's beer, while also carrying other brands. The
plaintiff alleged that Miller, under a plan to eliminate beer distributors car-
rying beer other than Miller's, induced Skyview into another market, cre-
ated a new distributorship, Star Distributing Company, and eventually
supplanted the plaintiff with Star. Skyview asserted that this plan restrained
trade, by allowing Miller to fix prices, and extended Miller's market control,
177. Id. at 406-07.
178. 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. den ied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973).
179. 609 F.2d at 406 (quoting 471 F.2d at 731).
180. See notes 173-74 supra.
181. 620 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1980).
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by depriving its competitors of local distributors for their beers. The Tenth
Circuit noted that the district court dismissed the complaint because the
lower court had determined that the plaintiff's injuries occurred before Star
Distributing was created. If this were true, Miller Brewing's actions were
unilateral, and unilateral anticompetitive behavior does not violate section 1
of the Sherman Act.18 2 The court of appeals, however, determined that
Star's creation three days before Miller Brewing terminated Skyview's dis-
tributorship provided "ample time for a conspiracy in restraint of trade to
come into being."' 18 3 The appeals court felt that it was not necessary to
explore the nature of the relationship between Miller Brewing and Star Dis-
tributing to determine whether they were separate entities who could con-
spire in violation of section 1; apparently, this was assumed.'
8 4
The court of appeals read Skyview's complaint as alleging more than
the mere substitution of a distributor. Generally, a producer may with im-
punity replace its distributor with another according to its business needs.'
8 5
Star's takeover was alleged to be in furtherance of an anticompetitive plan,
however, and thus was sufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion.1
8 6
Mark H. Boscoe
182. Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the unilateral actions of a business, even if harm-
ful to competitors, are not unlawful. "[C]ontract[s], combination[s] or conspirac[ies] in restraint
of trade . . ." are prohibited by section 1; none of these activities can be accomplished by one
entity. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). The unilateral substitution of one
distributor for another does not violate section 1. See Scanlan v. Anheuser-Busch, 388 F.2d 918
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 916 (1968).
183. 620 F.2d at 752.
184. The Tenth Circuit did not elaborate on the nature of the association between Miller
and Star, other than to state that the plaintiff alleged that "Miller Brewing Company caused
the Star Distributing Company to be formed for the express purpose of eventually taking over
Skyview's distributorship. ... 620 F.2d at 752.
Two or more associated corporations will not automatically be considered so closely linked
that they could not, as a matter of law, conspire as separate entities. The Supreme Court has
declared that "common ownership and control does not liberate [corporations] from the impact
of the antitrust laws .... " Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S.
211, 215 (1951) (parent and wholly-owned subsidiary found to have conspired). Apparently,
the Second Circuit has carved out an exception to the Court's views in Kwefer-Stewart when
affiliated companies do not compete with each other. Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co., 316 F.
Supp. 1321, 1326 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), af'dper curran, 451 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 922 (1972). But see Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 511-12
(3d Cir. 1976) (mere presence of two legally distinct corporations is sufficient for a conspiracy).
The bounds of an "intra-enterprise" conspiracy that will satisfy the concerted action require-
ment of section 1 of the Sherman Act has never been distinctly demarcated. See generally 16 J.
VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, § 6.01[21 (1979 & Supp. 1980);
Note, Intra-Enterprire Conspiraty Under Section I ofthe Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 MiCH.
L. REV. 717 (1977).
Based on the dearth of evidence available on the Miller Brewing-Star Distributing relation-
ship, a decision that, as a matter of law, Miller and Star could not have conspired would have
been precipitous. Miller and Star are not competitors; if the lower court, on remand, were to
accept the Second Circuit's view of conspiracy, summary judgment for the defendants might be
appropriate. See 16 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTrrRusT LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 6.01[2]e (1979).
185. Craig v. Sun Oil Co., 515 F.2d 221, 223 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829
(1976); Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1950). See gneraly Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
dentied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
186. See Natrona Serv., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 435 F. Supp. 99, 110 (D. Wyo. 1977),
aq'd, 598 F.2d 1294 (10th Cir. 1979).
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